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I. INTRODUCTION

A dam is built in China, displacing hundreds of people and drying up the
livelihoods of farmers and fisherfolk downstream;' another dam project in
Panama leads to a complaint in the Inter-American human rights system for
displacement and police brutality.2 Both projects proponents expect to generate
extra revenue from selling carbon credits on world markets. A forest planting
project in which a Norwegian power company leased lands to plant trees in
order to continue to emit carbon at home leads to the displacement of 8,000
people in Uganda Villagers, dispossessed by land grabs aimed at setting up
palm oil plantations to supply the European biofuels market, clash with police
and demand labor rights. 4 A waste-to-energy project in Thailand leads to
diminished food yields and increased exposure to hazardous silica dust.' A
number of indigenous peoples' organizations declare that carbon trading risks
their further marginalization and call for any efforts at climate-related forest
preservation to be subject to the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.6
What do these events have in common? They are all examples of ways in
which the emerging climate change treaty regime, and its domestic
implementation, are creating unanticipated human rights problems. Of course,
it is commonplace to recognize that the impacts of climate change will fall
heaviest on the most vulnerable people, worsening their ability to enjoy a wide
range of rights. It is also true that a failure to adequately mitigate carbon
emissions and to adapt to inevitable changes in the climate will further
exacerbate these impacts on rights. But in a number of places, the climate

Joe McDonald & Charles J. Hanley, China Dams Reveal Flaw in Climate-Change
Weapon, HuFFINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/25/chinadams-reveal-flaws-i_n_160692.html.
2 Cultural Survival, Dam Nation, http://www.culturalsurvival.org/current-projects/%5Bfi
eld_program-raw%/o5D/dam-nation (last visited May 22, 2010).
' Heidi Bachram, ClimateFraudandCarbon Colonialism: The New Trade in Greenhouse
Gases, CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIAuSM, Dec. 2004, at 5, 12.
4 James Painter, LosingLand to Palm Oil in Kalimantan, BBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2007, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6927890.stm.
' Tamra Gilbertson, How Sustainable are Small-Scale Biomass Factories?A Case Study
from Thailand,in UPSETTING THE OFFSET: THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF CARBON MARKETS 57
(Steffen B6hm & Siddhartha Dabhi eds., 2009).
6 See, e.g., Statement of International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change,
Sept. 27, 2009, availableat http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/forestissues/iipfcc_poli
cysept09_eng.pdf (declaring that indigenous peoples' rights must be respected in addressing
the climate crisis).
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change regime's single-minded focus on carbon reduction itself has unintended
negative consequences. These may include violations of the rights of farmers
or forest peoples, especially indigenous peoples, massive involuntary
displacement, or evictions as certain lands become more valuable. The climate
change regime may also create undesirable indirect human rights impacts,
affecting food, water, and energy security, and further impoverishing those that
are already poor. Resistance to eviction or resource loss is likely to lead to
violations of civil and political rights and to increased conflict. As these
impacts become more widely recognized, a number of possible responses have
emerged. This Article briefly considers the ways in which the climate change
treaty regime (and its national implementation strategies) could impact human
rights and in some cases itself cause human rights violations, and then looks at
a range of potential mechanisms for dealing with those impacts.'
Not all impacts of climate change on human rights constitute human rights
violations. It may be difficult to characterize causing climate change as itself
a violation since it is not clear that, until recently, states either knew or should
have known of the dangers of unrestricted greenhouse gas emissions.
However, the deliberate climate change policies of governments moving
forward, even if merely negligent rather than intentional, that result in
violations can be considered violations of state responsibility to respect,
protect, and fulfill rights.'
These are not the only possible areas of concern: adaptation, especially the
movement of large numbers of people, and agriculture also create significant
impacts, but this Article will leave them for another day. This Article considers
three areas where the current and emerging climate change treaty regime is
particularly problematic: flexibility mechanisms, especially the Clean
Development Mechanism; biofuels and energy; and forest preservation, known
as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). This
Article then turns to three possible ways of building human rights
considerations into the climate change regime, with their respective advantages
and drawbacks. The Article concludes with some thoughts about harmonizing
overlapping international legal regimes more generally.

7 There are a number of changes to the climate change treaty regime that would indirectly
affect the enjoyment of human rights, such as the ways in which emissions reductions are
allocated, the centrality of market mechanisms, and technology transfer or financing schemes.
These larger themes are beyond the scope of this Article.
' See Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, availableat http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3t2650b54.html (finding that the Turkish government failed to protect
individuals that lived near a garbage dump).
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THE UNFCCC TREATY REGIME

A. Flexibility or Market-basedMechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol requires all developed (known as Annex I) countries to
reduce their emissions of GHGs by a specified amount, generally calculated
from a 1990 baseline.9 In order to reduce the cost (and increase the political
palatability) of these reductions, the Protocol includes four "flexibility"
mechanisms, designed to allow emissions reductions to be taken at the lowest
possible cost. Three relate to trading among Annex I countries (Article 17
emissions trading, joint implementation, and Article 4 "bubbles").'0 The
fourth, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), outlined in Article 12 of
the Protocol, allows Annex I countries, or their private enterprises, to fund
activities in non Annex I countries that lead to emissions reductions, which can
then be certified as Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs)." These can be
counted against the Annex I country's emissions reduction requirements. 2
Non-Annex I countries under the Protocol have no limits on GHG emissions. 3
Since a ton of carbon reduced anywhere in the world has the same overall
effect on climate change, the drafters of the Protocol reasoned that allowing
certain kinds of carbon trading schemes would allow reductions to be taken in
the least expensive manner (by picking the "low-hanging fruit"). Thus, carbon
emitters that can reduce their emissions more than is required under their cap
can trade with those having difficulty meeting the requirements.
The most controversial mechanism has been the CDM, which was based on
the idea that installing new capacity in developing (especially rapidly
developing) countries will generally be cheaper than retrofitting or reducing
emissions from established sources in developed countries. CDM credits
could, ideally, serve as a source of revenue for developing countries to fund
"leap-frogging" over current carbon-intensive technologies and accelerate
development. The use of CDM credits would also reduce the costs for
developed country industry to comply with "cap-and-trade" schemes at home,
thus enhancing the political feasibility of implementing such schemes.
Article 12 of the Protocol specifies:

' Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
arts. 2-3, openedfor signatureMar. 16, 1998,2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol],
availableat http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
Id. arts. 4, 17.
"Id.
art. 12.
12

Id.

13

id.
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The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to
assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the
Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3.4
CDM projects are proposed by private developers, approved by the states
where the project will be located and where any resulting CERs will be used,
verified for compliance with CDM rules by private third-parties, and then
approved by the CDM Executive Board. 5 CERs can be awarded only after a
further verification that the project is actually in operation as proposed.
As of 2009, there were 1,860 registered CDM projects in fifty-eight
countries, 16 with the bulk in China and India.
In addition, almost 400 requests for registration are currently
being considered and approximately 2,900 further project
activities are in the process of being validated by DOEs. The
number of registered projects for which CERs have been issued
has increased by 32[%], [and] some 335 million CERs... hav[e]
been generated. .

...

7

Only 6% of requests for registration are rejected.'" By 2012, the CDM is
expected to produce 1.5 billion CERs, worth approximately $30 billion.' 9
Some CDM projects, including large hydroelectric dams, waste-to-energy,
and afforestation projects, have been particularly problematic from a human
rights standpoint. As of May 2, 2010, 1,414 hydro projects were registered or
seeking registration under the CDM, of which 685 were considered large

14

Id.

"5UNFCCC, CDM Project Activity Cycle, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/pac/index.html
(last visited June 26, 2010).
16 Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Annual Report of the Executive Board of the Clean
Development Mechanism, 10, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16 (Nov. 4,2009), available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cmp5/eng/16.pdf.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19.
'9 INT'L RIVERS NETWORK, RIP-OFFSETS: THE FAELuRE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL'S CLEAN

DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 2 (2008), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/

CDMfactsheetlowe-rez.pdf.
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projects (i.e., with installed capacity greater than 15 MW). 20 Almost 65% of
these large projects are in China, a country known for forced displacement and
resulting violations of civil rights as well as lack of redress as a result of earlier
dam projects. 21

In addition to forced displacement, some of the more

controversial CDM dam projects have impacted the livelihood of fisherfolk and
farmers deprived of downstream water flows, and the civil rights of protesters
opposing the projects.
While all CDM projects are supposed to contribute to "sustainable
development" and to be subject to environmental impact assessments, both of
these provisions are wholly dependent on national law and are not explored in
any detail during the validation process. Similarly, requirements that local
stakeholders be allowed to comment, and that comments be reported, usually
result in pro forma requests for comments that ignore local opposition to a
given project.2 2 Safeguards put in place in the European Union (EU) to ensure
that all CERs purchased from large hydro projects meet the standards of the
World Commission on Dams are hobbled by the fact that the same verifiers are
responsible for certifying both WCD and CDM compliance. 23 A review of the
CDM mechanism at COP-15 led to proposals to discount certain CERs and to
stress projects with co-benefits, however no final decisions were reached.24

20 Int'l Rivers Network, Spreadsheet of Hydro Projects in the CDM Project Pipeline

(May 2, 2010), availableat http://www.intemationarivers.org/node/1785 (spreadsheet updated
on a monthly basis).
21Id. For information on human rights problems with previous Chinese large hydro projects,
see INT'L RIVERS NETWORK, HUMAN RIGHTS DAMMED OFF AT THREE GORGES: AN
INVESTIGATION OF RESETTLEMENT AND HuMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THE THREE GORGES DAM

PROJECT (2003), available at http://www.intemationarivers.org/files/3gcolor.pdf, and Peter
Bosshard, China Dams the World, 26 WORLD POLICY J. 43 (2009).

See, e.g., Int'l Rivers Network, Comments to TOV SOD on Baba Multipurpose
Hydroelectric Project (Ecuador) (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.intemationahivers.org/en/globalwarming/carbon-trading-cdm/comments-t%C3%BCv-s%C3%BCd-baba-multipurposehydroelectric-project-ecuador (outlining the lack of stakeholder consultations).
23 See Council Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of27 October 2004 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol's Project
Mechanisms, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18.
24 Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex, at 33, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/I 7 (Jan. 28, 2010).
22

2010]

"FIRST, Do No HARM"

B. Biofuels andEnergy
As part of the effort to reduce emissions, Annex I states have included
requirements in national law for increased use of renewable energy, including
biofuels. For example, the EU's 2008 climate change policy requires that
by 2020, at least 10% of transport fuel in all member states must come from
renewables,25 such as biofuels, hydrogen, "green" electricity and the like. U.S.
legislation, passed by the House of Representatives in 2007, has fuel content
requirements as well.26

The human-rights related concerns regarding the production of biofuels
center on their effect on food prices and availability and on their displacement
27
of other land uses, especially forests, small-scale agriculture, and peat bogs.
Land conversion to biofuel production contributed to a spike in food prices
in 2007, as crops previously used to feed livestock or people instead went into
fuel production, thus lowering supply and increasing price.28 While increased
prices might benefit farmers, they harm consumers, especially in foodimporting countries. 29 In this case most of the concern was with corn-based

ethanol, largely produced by agro-industrial giants, or soy-based fuels.3"
"Second-generation" biofuels, generated from wastes like sugarcane bagasse,
do not raise the same concern regarding direct competition between food and
fuel uses.3 However, as discussed regarding CDM, the ability to create a
lucrative alternative fuel source may provide the marginal benefit that
encourages conversion to sugar, palm oil, and other large-scale crops, which
require little permanent labor and may displace food for local consumption.32
25 EUROPA, The EU Climate and Energy Package, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/

climateaction.htm (last visited May 22, 2010). Admittedly, national biofuel subsidies and
incentives do not respond solely to climate concerns, rather they respond to the need for energy
security, local air pollution, and the economic health of corn and sugar producers and also
influencers. Nonetheless, the need for renewable energy is a frequently cited justification for
encouraging such fuels.
26 Energy Independence and Security Act of2007, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 17021-17022 (West 2010).
27 Developed Countries' Demandfor Biofuels Has Been 'Disastrous,' GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Aug. 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/aug/17/biofuels.
2' Donald Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices (World Bank Policy Research, Working
PaperNo. 4682,2008), availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=1233058.
29
30

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.

31 INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, FROM 1ST- TO 2ND-GENERATION BIOFUEL TECHNOLOGIES: AN

OVERVIEW OF CURRENT INDUSTRY AND RD&D ACTIVITIES 5 (2008), available at http://www.

iea.org/papers/2008/2ndbiofuelGen.pdf.
32 Liz Gooch, Success ofPalm Oil BringsPlantationsUnderPressureto PreserveHabitats,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 17, 2009, at B4, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/business/
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Large landowners, or those with access to sizeable amounts of capital, may be
better positioned to benefit from such biofuel generating projects, while the
poor may find themselves worse-off. The conversion to large scale palm-oil
plantations may also put pressure on small farmers to sell out to large
agribusiness concerns, better able to take advantage of world markets, thus
accelerating the transformation of small farmers into landless laborers, with
impacts on the right to an adequate standard of living. Moreover, the definition
of what constitutes "waste" may be different for project developers versus local
people who incorporate the use of a wide range of agricultural products into
their livelihood.33
Additional concerns relate to agricultural conversion. In Southeast Asia,
conversion of forests and peat bogs to palm-oil plantations is particularly
worrisome. 34 Forests provide a home as well as food and other services to
many rural peoples, especially indigenous peoples. Peat bogs sequester carbon,
and wetland peats also serve as habitat and storm breaks.35 In March 2009, the
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) took the
Indonesian government to task for failing to consult with and " 'secure the
possession and ownership rights of local communities before proceeding
further' with the Kalimantan Border Oil Palm Megaproject.36
In Brazil, most of the biofuel-related deforestation has been indirect; as
grazing land was converted to biofuels, new forest was felled to create more
grazing land. 37 The net result has been an increase in burning-induced haze and

global/18palm.html.
" For example, in a rice-husk-to-energy CDM project in Thailand, the "waste" turned out
to be an integral component of a natural fertilizer. The increased demand for the husks made
them cost prohibitive for local farmers, who had to buy chemical fertilizers or do without. See
Gilbertson, supra note 5.
"4See Ian MacKinnon, Palm Oil: The Biofuel ofthe Future Drivingan EcologicalDisaster
Now, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 4,2007, at 23, availableat http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2007/apr/04/energy.indonesia (discussing the impact of the rapid deforestation in Indonesia and
Malaysia to plant palm crops).
31 Wetlands International, Peatlands and C02 Emissions, http://www.wetlands.org/Whatwe
do/PeatlandsandCO2emissions/tabid/837/Default.aspx (last visited June 26,2010). On carbon
sequestration, see Richard Harris, Bogs Watchedfor Warning Signs of Carbon Upset, NPR,
Aug. 25, 2004, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=3871344.
36 Letter from Fatimata-Binta Victoire Dah, Chairperson of the Comm. for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, to I. Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent
Representative, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indon. to the United Nations Office at
Geneva(Mar. 13,2009), availableat http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/asia_pacific/indo
nesia-cerd-response-mar09_eng.pdf.
" David M. Lapola et al., IndirectLand-use Changes Can Overcome CarbonSavingsfrom
Biofuels in Brazil, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 3388, 3388 (B.L. Turner ed., 2010).

20101

"FIRST, Do No HARM"

the destruction of local biodiversity and of resources local people depended
upon."
Thus, the demand for biofuels in developed countries fuels extensive human
rights problems in the biofuel source countries.39 The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have recognized this connection. The
OHCHR wrote: "Whereas agro-fuel production could bring positive benefits
for climate change and for farmers in developing countries, agro-fuels have
also contributed to increasing the price of food commodities 'because of the
competition between food, feed and fuel for scarce arable land.' "' In 2008,
CESCR urged states to implement strategies to combat global climate change
that do not negatively affect the right to adequate food and freedom from
hunger.4
Changes in energy generation toward "clean," non-carbon intensive energy
are key to the reductions that will be needed to stabilize the atmosphere. But
the definition of what is meant by "clean," and decisions on the benefits and
drawbacks, even of renewables, have been largely absent from the discussions
within the UN regime. For example, the choices among using centralized
power grids to distribute energy from non-polluting sources, using distributed
energy at the household level (like rooftop solar panels), or using small-scale
community-based energy sources will have large impacts on the ability to
ensure and promote rights, especially for the poor and for those who do not
now have access to electricity. Large-scale energy grids may well be the most
efficient way to bring energy to cities, but the pricing may be beyond most of
the poor's capacity and may delay rural electrification; some large-scale
projects (like thermal solar or wind farms) may also have land use implications.
It is easy to imagine, for example, the desert or grassland habitats of indigenous
or nomadic people being appropriated as "empty" space for energy production.

3 MacKinnon, supranote 34.
3 The EU's 2009 Renewable Energy Directive recognizes this reality to some extent, requiring
that biofuels and bioliquids imported into the EU be sustainably produced in a way that does not
impact primary forests, ecologically significant grasslands, or peat bogs, and calling for the creation
of certification systems for sustainably produced biofuels and for monitoring of the indirect effects
of renewable energy production on agriculture. Council Directive 2009/28/EC 2009 O.J.
(L140) 16.
0The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Office of the United Nations
High CommissionerforHuman Rights on the RelationshipBetween Climate ChangeandHuman
Rights, 66, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009)
(quoting the Special Rapporteur on the right to food).
41 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., Statement
on the World Food Crisis, 13, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2008/1 (May 20, 2008).
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Distributed energy on a household basis may provide a greater degree of
energy security and independence, while local-level community energy projects
may create more lasting jobs and spin-off benefits. It is not clear at this point
which combination of alternatives is preferable, or even possible, in any given
locale; the point is merely that the decisions made in the next few decades
regarding the shape of energy distribution and generation will have human
rights implications that need to be taken into account.
C. Forests and REDD
Deforestation and forest degradation are responsible for about 18% of
global carbon emissions,42 while standing forests are carbon sinks. Maintaining
standing forests does not come within the purview of CDM, but projects to
afforest and reforest cleared land do play a small part (1%). Forests in Annex
I countries may be affected by rules, known as LULUCF, dealing with
afforestation, reforestation and other land use change.43 In addition, states have
been negotiating rules for developing countries to obtain credits for
maintaining and enhancing standing forests. The 2007 Bali Action Plan calls
for the parties to consider "[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
in developing countries [REDD]; and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing
countries [REDD+]...."" Talks on REDD+ moved ahead at Copenhagen and
pilot projects are proceeding. In anticipation of global and national legislation,

42

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: An Options Assessment

Report, http://www.redd-oar.org/ (last visited June 26, 2010).
4' Afforestation and reforestation projects may count against a country's baseline emissions
under the Kyoto Protocol, but avoided deforestation projects were not included because of worries
about leakage (if some forest is off-limits, timber cutting may just move to other areas),
permanence (forests can bum), and measurement and monitoring difficulties. Roger A. Sedjo &
Brent Sohngen, Carbon CreditsforAvoidedDeforestation1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion
Paper No. 07-47, 2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documentsRFF-DP-07-47.pdf.
44 Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali,
Indon., Dec. 3-15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties,
1, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008). REDD+ is being negotiated on the Long-Term
Cooperative Action (AW-LCA) track of the talks. To prepare for inclusion of REDD+ in a future
climate regime, UNDP, UNEP, and FAQ created UN-REDD, a program that works with
developing countries to inventory forest resources, create monitoring and verification protocols and
develop plans to implement REDD+ at the national level. Twenty-two countries are now part of
the program. UN-REDD Programme, About the Un-REDD Programme, http://un-redd.org/About
UNREDDProgrammeltabid/583/languageen-US/Default.aspx (last visited June 26, 2010).
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a huge market in voluntary forest carbon offsets has blossomed. That market
was worth $110 million in 2006,"5 although, influenced by the recession, it
went down to some $37 million in 2008.'
Whenever forests are at issue, the human rights of the people who live in
them, depend on them, or are threatened by their destruction are also at stake.
The promise and peril of avoided deforestation payments has divided
indigenous peoples and advocates. On the one hand, if there is no financial
incentive to keep forests standing, they will almost surely be destroyed at
accelerating rates. If local communities were designated the owners of "their"
forest carbon, REDD+ could serve as a much-needed source of funding under
local control and a means of preserving a way of life. On the other hand, if
forests become more valuable as carbon-sequestering stands, and especially if
developed countries and their industries can avoid reducing their own
emissions by purchasing large quantities of forest offsets, land grabs could well
be the result. This possibility is exacerbated by the uncertain land and usufruct
rights of many indigenous and forest peoples. Without clear title and the
ability to use and benefit from forests, indigenous people would again be
pushed off newly valuable land.4 7
Some features of the climate regime already create specific worries about
REDD. The current definitions of "forest," "afforestation," and "reforestation"
allow both continuing large-scale logging and the eventual replacement of
native forest with plantations of quick-growing monoculture, to the detriment
of local water supplies and agriculture.48
"Forest degradation" and

" David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: ForestCarbon Offsets, ClimateChangeAdaptation,and
InternationalLaw, 15 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 60 (2009).
' Ecosystem Marketplace, Forest Carbon Cheat Sheet: The Numbers, http://www.ecosyste
mmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page-id=7470&section=news-artices&
eod=l (last visited June 26, 2010).
47 See Indigenous Peoples' Global Summit on Climate Change, Anchorage, Alaska,
Apr. 20-24, 2009, Anchorage Declaration(Apr. 24, 2009), availableat http://www.indigenous
summit.com/servlet/content/declaration.html.
48 "Forest" is defined under the Marrakesh Accords as:
[A] minimum area of land of 0.05B1.0 hectares with tree crown cover (or
equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30[%] with trees with the
potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 metres at maturity in situ ....
Young natural stands and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown
density of 10-30[%] or tree height of 2-5 metres are included under forest,
as are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are temporarily
unstocked as a result of human intervention such as harvesting or natural
causes but which are expected to revert to forest.
Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001,
Report of the Conference of the Parties: Addendum,
l(a), Annex, U.N. Doc.
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"deforestation" might be interpreted to cover the traditional swidden
agriculture practices of indigenous peoples, which can in fact be sustainable.49
In addition to concerns about exclusion, land grabs, or lack of clear title to
forest lands or to their carbon benefits, the overriding issue is that of voice and
participation. Indigenous peoples have uniformly urged that any REDD+
proposal must conform to the provisions of the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP or the Declaration).5" Among the relevant
provisions are requirements that "[s]tates ... consult and cooperate in good
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may
affect them."'" The Declaration also recognizes indigenous peoples' rights to
their traditional lands, territories, and resources, to fair demarcation of their
territories, to self-government, and to preserve indigenous knowledge. 2
Despite widespread, although not unanimous, state support for the
Declaration," national laws continue to disenfranchise indigenous peoples. For
example, the CERD communication mentioned above also noted that
Indonesia's 2008 "Regulation on Implementation Procedures for Reducing

FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002). In Copenhagen, the parties tentatively agreed to
include a separate definition of plantation forestry and to not allow reforestation on lands
converted after 1989 to count for credit-generating purposes. However, these are still draft
decisions. Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, 1, Annex, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/17 (Jan. 28, 2010).
"9Moreover, if offsets under REDD follow the logic of CDM, they would be issued based
on measurement of a "business as usual" baseline, and calculation of the difference between
newly sequestered carbon compared to what would have happened had deforestation continued
apace. That baseline methodology would favor logging concessions and large logging and cattle
companies over reserves and other areas controlled by indigenous and forest peoples and
communities, which have already reduced or eliminated logging and land-clearing on their lands.
Even if REDD is not project based, differences among regions may create similar concerns over
"additionality."
'o Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
Id. art. 19.
52 Id. arts. 3-4, 13, 26, 29, 31.
St

3 Indigenous Rights Outlined by UN, BBC NEWS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/6993776.stm. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States-all states with sizeable
indigenous populations-voted against the Declaration. Id. Since then, Australia and New Zealand
have accepted it, and the U.S. and Canada have announced that they are "reconsidering" their
opposition. Posting of Juliette Terzieff to World Politics Review Blog, http://www.worldpolitic
sreview.com/blog/5450/holdouts-endorse-u-n-indigenous-rights-declaration (Apr. 22, 2010).
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Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation" does not recognize any
proprietary rights of indigenous peoples in forests.54
Ill. INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS INTO THE CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME

A. Linking Language in the Treaty Regime

If emerging climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are to "do no
harm," and if they are to avoid a human rights-related backlash, then human
rights must somehow be incorporated into the regime. One way to ensure more
attention to human rights concerns is to insert human rights language into the
text of the documents that emerge as successors to the Kyoto Protocol and any
additional treaty texts. By explicitly referencing human rights in the treaty,
states would be more likely to consider their existing human rights legal
obligations when implementing relevant policies. Such language would serve
as a "bridge" between the climate change regime and the corpus of
international human rights law. A coalition of NGOs has called for exactly this
result.55
Certain parts of the current draft text lend themselves to the incorporation
of human rights language. The "shared vision" text prepared by the Long-term
Cooperative Action (LCA) working group was to set out the basic preambular
goals of an agreement. The latest draft states:
Noting resolution 10/4 of the United Nations Human Rights
Council on "Human rights and climate change", which recognizes
that the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct
and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human
rights and that the effects of climate change will be felt most
acutely by those segments of the population that are already
vulnerable owing to geography, gender, age, indigenous or
minority status and disability... 56

See Letter from Fatimata-Binta Victoire Dah to I. Gusti Agung Wesaka Puja, supranote 36.
" Human Rights and Climate Change Working Group, Proposed Revisions to Maintain and
Strengthen Human Rights Protections in the LCA Text (Dec. 9, 2009), http://unearthed.earthjus
tice.org/files/HumanRightsLCA.pdf.
56 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Text to FacilitateNegotiations
Among Parties,Bonn, Ger., June 1-11,2010, Annex I, at 6, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6
14
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The language is weak and non-operational, with "noting" signifying a
noncommittal attitude toward the Human Rights Council's efforts. Most
importantly, nothing in the text creates any obligation to refer or pay attention
to human rights, or in any way ties the climate regime to the protection and
promotion of human rights.
The negotiated text on REDD+ is slightly better. After intense lobbying
from indigenous groups and other NGOs, the relevant text reads:
The Conference of the Parties
2. Furtheraffirms that when undertaking activities referred to in
paragraph 3 below, the following safeguards should be
[promoted] [and] [supported]:
(c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples
and members of local communities, by taking into account
relevant international obligations, national circumstances and
laws, and noting that the General Assembly has adopted the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
(d) Full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders,
including in particular indigenous peoples and local
communities .... ."
The draft references the need for participation rights and notes that states are
subject to other "relevant" international obligations. The text also "notes" the
existence of UNDRIP, although without in any way committing states parties
to follow its provisions in dealing with indigenous peoples. However, there is
no reference to free, prior informed consent or to human rights, which had been
central goals of the indigenous groups.
A third logical venue for incorporating human rights language into the text
would be to add a section on "economic and social consequences of response
measures." The origins ofthis issue go back to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which in Article 4.8(h) requires state parties

(May 17, 2010).
" U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention on its Eighth Session,
Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-15, 2009, Annex 1, at 34-35, U.N. Doe. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/I 7
(Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Report ofA WGLCA].
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to consider the impacts of response measures on the economies of fossil-fuel
exporting statesf 8 The current language seems aimed at cushioning the
economic effects of changes in energy provision on fossil-fuel producing states
and others dependent on tourism and other such transport-intensive industries,
and on avoiding trade restrictions on developing states.
There is no human rights language, although there are references to jobs and
other issues. However, the current draft shows the potential for linkage to
other international regimes. One of the developing countries concerns in the
climate change negotiations is that developed countries will make their own
mitigation requirements more politically palatable by imposing border taxes on
imports from countries that have not mitigated their emissions to a similar
degree. To discourage this result, developing countries have pushed hard for
language on trade in this section of the negotiations. The proposed language,
prohibiting measures that "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade," 9 mirrors
language in Article 20 of the WTO agreement and presumably would be
interpreted taking into account the interpretative practice within the WTO. A
similar linkage to the interpretation of human rights treaties and general human
rights law by the relevant expert or judicial bodies could be accomplished
through parallel language on human rights in this section.
B. Private Standard-setting
At a project level, human rights standards could be imported into REDD,
CDM, or other carbon offsets to create private standards to ensure that projects
and programs comply with certain specified principles, standards, and
indicators. The use of private standards in the environmental and labor rights
arenas is by now well established.6" Such standards, while nominally
voluntary, can be given teeth through their adoption by third-party verifiers,
investors, bankers, or regulators. Such voluntary standards have a number of

58

See also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 2.3, 3.14.

9 Report ofA WGLCA, supra note 57, at 40.
o See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International
Organizationfor Standardizationand Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 479 (1995); HARD CHOICES, SoFr LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL

TRADE (John J. Kirton & Michael J.Trebilcock eds., 2004). For example, the ISO 14,000 series

on environmental management systems, or SA 8,000 on labor standards are well recognized.
Some of these standards result in certification, which brings a premium price for the products
generated by the certified entity. Relevant examples include organic agriculture certification or
the label of the Forest Stewardship Council.
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advantages: they can be more quickly drafted and approved by a wide group
of stakeholders; they can be tailored to specific sectors and industries; and they
can transfer the cost of verification onto project proponents. They are aimed
directly at private developers and carbon traders, not states, and are one of the
few ways of holding such private actors accountable. Nonetheless, they can
also be adopted by states and international organizations.
A number of private or private/public standards efforts are relevant to the
human rights-sensitive aspects of climate change mitigation. The CDM Gold
Standard6 1 certifies high-quality CDM credits (which fetch premium prices)
through standards that include case-by-case consideration of large hydroelectric
or palm oil biofuel projects.62 A Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)
was formed in 2004 by a coalition of palm oil growers, distributors, financiers,
large retail consumers, and environmental NGOs to create standards that
include respect for land and labor rights. The quality and nature of forest
carbon offsets is also subject to the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), which
is widely used by the World Bank as well as private carbon exchanges.6 3 The
Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) seeks to "promote
integrated solutions to land management around the world .. . [and] has

developed voluntary standards to help design and identify land management
activities that simultaneously minimize climate change, support sustainable
development and conserve biodiversity. 4 Its fourteen mandatory certification
criteria require that environmental and social monitoring programs are in place,
communities are appropriately involved in the design of the project, and there
are no unresolved land tenure issues.65
These private standard-setting exercises may be useful in creating clear
benchmarks against which to measure whether projects are likely to create
significant negative human rights impacts, and could be incorporated into
national law, CDM, or REDD guidelines, or aid programs as well as private
61

THE GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION, REQUIREMENTS (2008), availableathttp://www.cdm

goldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6_GS-technicaldocs/GSv2/GVS2_Requirements.pdf.
62

THE GOLD STANDARD FOUNDATION, ANNEx C: GUIDANCE ON PROJECT TYPE ELIGIBILITY

(2009), availableat http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/fileadmin/editors/files/6_GS-technical_
docs/GSv2. 1/Annex C.pdf.
63 See VOLUNTARY CARBON STANDARD, GUIDANCE FOR AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND
OTHER LAND USE PROJECTS (2007), availableat http://www.v-c-s.org/docs/AFOLU%2OGuida
nce%20Document.pdf.
Climate, Community & Biodiversity Alliance, http://www.climate-standards.org/index.
html (last visited May 23, 2010).
65

CLIMATE, CMTY. & BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, PROJECT DESIGN STANDARDS (2d ed. 2008),

availableathttp://www.climate-standards.org/standards/pd/ccb-standards-second-edition-dece
mber_2008.pdf.
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offset transactions. However, there are a number of drawbacks to this
approach. First, the standards are currently voluntary, so problematic projects
can seek CERs or carbon offset credits without complying. Second, the same
verifiers who provide third-party validation for CDM or REDD projects
generally are also in charge of standards validation. There is a strong incentive
on the part of these verifiers not to upset their future potential employers by
denying certification. Third, the standards themselves are, for the most part,
quite weak (although the CCBA standards are considerably more detailed and
stringent), allowing almost all projects on a case-by-case basis, and requiring
little in the way of community consent and participation beyond what CDM or
REDD already requires.
C. Creatingan Expert Body within the UNFCCC
A third option would be to create a body within the Framework Convention
that could evaluate, advise on, and create guidelines for dealing with human
rights issues that arise as a result of mitigation or adaptation measures. A
recent paper proposes the creation of a human rights process within the
UNFCCC that would serve to clarify existing human rights standards as
applied to climate change policies, provide a forum for dialogue and
information sharing, and provide technical support to vulnerable states.66 Such
a process would be consistent with the UN Secretary-General's call to
mainstream human rights throughout the UN system.67 Rather than simply link
the climate change regime to the body of standards and treaty commitments
adopted by states in the human rights arena, this option would develop an inhouse expert capacity within the UNFCCC to use and apply these standards.
There is ample precedent for such an effort. The parties to the UNFCCC have
already created two subsidiary bodies: the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation
(SBI). 68 A subsidiary body for human rights and social impacts could adopt
much the same form. "As its name suggests, the SBSTA's task is to provide
the Conference of the Parties (COP) with advice on scientific, technological
' A parallel human rights body could advise the
and methodological matters."69
66 INT'L HuMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC ET AL., PROTECTING PEOPLE AND THE PLANET: A
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE PoLIcY (2009),

PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE

availableathttp://www.law.berkeley.edu/filesfIHRLC/ProtectingPeopleand-thePlanet.pdf.
67

Id. at 3.

61

UNFCCC, Convention Bodies, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/convention/conv

entionbodies/items/2629.php (last visited May 23, 2010).
69 Id.
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COP on the relevant human rights standards, seek ways to avoid human rights
impacts from climate change policies, collate best practices, and study
emerging issues.
Alternatively, the COP can create an expert group, composed of experts
acting in their personal capacity. These too already exist within the UNFCCC
structure; they are less formal, and therefore perhaps less politically difficult
to create, than subsidiary bodies.
There has been some resistance to creating an explicit human rights link
within the climate regime for a number of reasons. The current complexity of
the regime makes it hard to advocate for adding yet another layer. Beyond that,
the anthropocentric nature of human rights, the idea that rights constitute
threshold or minimum requirements that constrain action independently of the
economic or scientific tradeoffs, and a sense that evaluating human rights
compliance will slow down a process of transformation that needs to move
quickly, are all part of the hesitation in some quarters to see the climate
negotiations be drawn into consideration of associated human rights issues. In
addition, human rights-based limits can threaten potentially lucrative project
opportunities, which creates a different source of opposition.
An alternative might focus instead on the existing system of human rights
protection. This might include a special procedure on climate change within the
Human Rights Council, consideration of climate change and the effects of
climate policies as a cross-cutting issue by existing special procedure and
special mandate holders, the elaboration of general comments by the respective
expert bodies on the intersection of particular treaties with climate change
response measures, and the like.7 °
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Each of these proposals has its strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps the best
answer, at least for now, is that all of these options should be explored. Private
standards, even with the limitations described above, may be useful in
curtailing the worst proposed projects, diffusing norms, and serving as a
template for national-level regulations. They will surely be faster to put into
operation than the other options, but also have the drawbacks of voluntariness
and lack of stringency discussed above. Language in the climate change
regime would set expectations, carry out norm-diffusion on human rights

70See CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW & FRIEDRICH EBERT ST[FTUNG, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE: PRACTICAL STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION (2009), availableat http://hrbapor

tal.org/wp-content/files/12474899328_11

resfile.pdf.
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throughout the UN system, and avoid overburdening an already complex treaty
regime with the need to develop new expertise. However, without a way to
operationally link the climate change and human rights regimes it is not clear
how-and by whom-state compliance is to be monitored and enforced.
Effective use of "linking language" might require a permanent rapporteur or
special representative within the Human Rights Council to monitor and report
on state practice, and a way of forwarding the rapporteur's views to the
relevant states and international organizations. 71 It might also require, at a
minimum, a deepening of the existing contacts between the JNFCCC
Secretariat and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
an expansion of those contacts to the CDM Executive Board and other
UNFCCC-related entities. On the other hand, an in-house expert body might
be better situated to deal with unexpected or emerging problems, and to
balance the human rights consequences of inaction as well as action. To do so,
it would need experts in human rights and development, and a way of reporting
regularly to the COP. Either solution will require consideration of the best
institutional home for these concerns.
The need to harmonize separate, but increasingly overlapping, international
law regimes, is not unique to this area. Others, including the International Law
Commission, have written extensively on the "relative normativity" problem
of reconciling different horizontal yet overlapping areas of law.72 Another
doctrinal solution is the application of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states that in the process of treaty
interpretation "[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties."73 Thus, any specific rules in the climate change treaty regime
would have to be read subject to states existing or emerging human rights
commitments, whether conventional or customary.

7"While the UN Human Rights Council has passed resolutions noting the effects of climate
change on the enjoyment of human rights and has commissioned a study from the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, it has not to date appointed a special rapporteur on the
issue. See H.R.C. Res. 10/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/4 (Mar. 25,2009) (discussing concerns
that climate change poses an immediate threat to people around the world); H.R.C. Res. 7/23,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/4 (Mar. 28, 2008) (noting that "climate change poses an immediate
and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the
full enjoyment of human rights").
72 See, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, FragmentationoflnternationalLaw:DifficultiesArisingfrom
the DiversificationandExpansion oflnternationalLaw,U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13,2006)
(finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (discussing the effect of different overlapping regimes).
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
33 1.
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One example of a mechanism to deal with overlapping, and at times
conflicting, legal norms is the Committee on Trade and Environment within the
World Trade Organization. Created in 1994 out of a perceived need to
harmonize the trade regime with the trade provisions of multilateral
environmental agreements, the CTE allows for consideration of ongoing and
emerging issues at the intersection of trade and environment, has stimulated
observer status for representatives of the various treaty secretariats at each
other's meetings, and has given the need to take both regimes into account a
higher profile, perhaps reflected in the decisions of trade dispute resolution
panels referencing relevant norms outside the trade regime as well as in the
crafting of environmental agreements with trade provisions.74 While not by
any means a perfect solution, the CTE might be a model to consider within the
climate change regime.
In the end, the overwhelming need to retool our energy and transportation
systems and to adapt to existing and future changes in the climate may involve
tradeoffs and some of those tradeoffs may violate rights. However, it is
incumbent on all of us to make sure that the human rights impacts of the
measures we take to respond to a changing climate do not systematically fall
on the shoulders of those with the fewest rights and the greatest vulnerability,
that we think about and avoid the possible negative social and rights-related
consequences of proposed actions, and that we adequately inform, include, and
if necessary compensate those who are potentially affected by specific climate
change-related policies.

" World Trade Organization, Items on the CTE's Work Programme, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/envir-e/cte00_e.htm (last visited June 26, 2010).

